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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent
VS e

Case No. 20176

PAUL TRAVIS REESE SANWICK,
Defendant/Appellant/
Petitioner

PETITION FOR REHEARING
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a petition for rehearing of an amended per
curiam decision filed by this Court on January 30, 1986.
Originally, this case was an appeal from a guilty plea and
conviction of rape, a first degree felony, by Paul Travis Reese
Sanwick.

Mr. Sanwick was sentenced in the Third Judicial

District Court in and for Salt Lake County, before the Honorable
Jay E. Banks, Judge, to five years to life imprisonment on
July 30, 1984.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts are set forth in the Brief of Appellant
(Appellant's Brief at 1-3).
ARGUMENT
In its amended per curiam opinion, State v. Sanwick,
Opinion No. 20176 (Utah 1986) , this Court has either overlooked
or misapprehended the main contention advanced by Appellant's
Brief.

In this case a district court judge clearly ignored the
plain requirement of a state statute.

Defense counsel moved

the trial court for an order requiring the prosecutor to produce
two witnesses in the case, Tamara and Andara Sanwick, whose
whereabouts were unknown to defense counsel (R. 33) . The prosecutor in the case had previously refused to voluntarily comply with
such a request (R. 60). The defendant's attorney wanted the
witnesses to be available either for an informal interview or
to present testimony at the sentencing proceeding (R. 60). The
witnesses were vital to the defense to refute allegations of
violence during the crime.

The trial judge heard the defense

motion four days prior to the sentencing and summarily denied
the motion even though no opposition was presented by the prosecutor
(R. 60) .
Utah Code Ann. §77-18-1(4) (1953 as amended) (Addendum
A) clearly states that a sentencing court "shall hear any testimony. . . the defendant . . . may wish to present concerning the
appropriate sentence."

(emphasis added.)

This code section is

neither vague nor ambiguous in its statement that a trial judge
"shall" hear "any" evidence which a defendant wishes to present
at a sentencing proceeding.

The section plainly requires that

a defendant be allowed to present any evidence concerning the
sentence.

The judge is left with no discretion in the matter.
In this case, the trial judge ignored the dictates of

the statute.

The judge did not hear evidence which the defendant

wished to present.

This Court's opinion stated:
-2-

"At the time

of sentencing, the court heard testimony defendant wanted to
present concerning the appropriate sentence."
Opinion No. 20176 at 2 (Utah 1986).

State v. Sanwick,

Further, the opinion said:

"Defendant had every chance to examine fully and controvert any
prejudicial information that he claimed played a part in the
sentencing procedure."

IxL at 4.

These statements are erroneous.

In fact, the trial judge's refusal to allow Mr. Sanwick to present
or even interview two vital witnesses makes both of these statements nonsequiturs.

At the time of sentencing, the court did

not hear testimony which the defendant wanted to present.

Further-

more, the defendant did not have a chance to controvert prejudicial
information through essential testimony.
The opinion in this case seems to focus on the use of
hearsay in the presentence report.
issue presented on appeal.

However, this was not the

Further, the opinion expresses a

concern that the evidence which Mr. Sanwick wished to present
at the sentencing hearing was tantamount to a withdrawal of
his guilty plea.

Id. at 3.

The record does not support this

concern and this, also, was not the issue presented on appeal.
However, the point not addressed by this Court in its opinion
is the contention which is the issue in this case—the Appellant's
claim that the sentencing judge violated statutory requirements
in the sentencing process.

(Appellant's Brief at 4.)

Procedural fairness is as important at the sentencing
phase as at the guilt phase of a criminal proceeding, State v.
Casarez, 656 P.2d 1005 (Utah 1982), and further, the sentencing

procedure must fulfill the requirements of due process, State v.
Lipsky, 608 P.2d 1241 (Utah 1980).

According to Utah Code Ann.

§77-18-1(4), the appellant should have been able to present any
testimony concerning his sentence.

However, an erroneous ruling

by the trial court prevented Mr. Sanwick from presenting such
tesitmony.

The ruling, which is as yet uncorrected, effectively

denied Mr. Sanwick due process of law.
CONCLUSION
Because this Court either misapprehended or overlooked
appellant's primary contention in its decision in this case, the
appellant respectfully petitions this Court to reconsider that
decision and reverse and remand his sentence for redetermination.
Respectfully submitted this

day of February, 1986.

CURTIS C. NESSET
Attorney for Petitioner

I hereby certify that I delivered four copies of the
foregoing to the Attorney Generalfs Office, 236 State Capitol
Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this

day of February,

1986.

CERTIFICATION
I, CURTIS C. NESSET, do hereby certify the following:
(1)

I am the attorney for appellant/petitioner in this
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case and;
(2)

This Petition for Rehearing is presented to this

Court in good faith and not to delay any matter in this case.
Respectfully submitted this _____ day of February, 1986.

CURTIS C. NESSET
Attorney for Appellant/Petitioner
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ADDENDUM A
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U t a h Code Ann.

§77-18-1(4)

(4) [fa-)] Prior to imposition ot an> sentence for an offense for which probation
may be granted, the court ma> with the concurrence of the defendant, continue
the date for the imposition of sentence for a reasonable period of time for the purpose of obtaining a pre-sentence report or information from other sources on the
defendant The report shall be prepared by [the Department of Adult Probation
ft«4 Parole] the adult probation and parole section of the Department of Corrections The report shall include a specific statement of pecuniary damages, accompanied b> a recommendation from Adult Probation and Parole regarding the payment
of restitution bv the defendant The contents of the report shall be confidential
The court may disclose all or parts of the report to the defendant or his counsel
as the interest of justice requires At the time of sentence, the court shall hear
an> testimony or information the defendant or the prosecuting attorney may wish
to present concerning the appropriate sentence This testimony or information shall
be presented in open court on record and in the presence of the defendant

